| Total: 55
Recently, cryptojacking malware has become an easy way of reaching and profiting from a large number of victims. Prior works studied the cryptojacking detection systems focusing on both in-browser and host-based cryptojacking malware. However, none of these earlier works investigated different attack configurations and network settings in this context. For example, an attacker with an aggressive profit strategy may increase computational resources to the maximum utilization to benefit more in a short time, while a stealthy attacker may want to stay undetected longer time on the victim's device. The accuracy of the detection mechanism may differ for an aggressive and stealthy attacker. Not only profit strategies but also the cryptojacking malware type, the victim's device as well as various network settings where the network is fully or partially compromised may play a key role in the performance evaluation of the detection mechanisms. In addition, smart home networks with multiple IoT devices are easily exploited by the attackers, and they are equipped to mine cryptocurrency on behalf of the attacker. However, no prior works investigated the impact of cryptojacking malware on IoT devices and compromised smart home networks. In this paper, we first propose an accurate and efficient IoT cryptojacking detection mechanism based on network traffic features, which can detect both in-browser and host-based cryptojacking. Then, we focus on the cryptojacking implementation problem on new device categories (e.g., IoT) and designed several novel experiment scenarios to assess our detection mechanism to cover the current attack surface of the attackers. Particularly, we tested our mechanism in various attack configurations and network settings. For this, we used a dataset of network traces consisting of 6.4M network packets and showed that our detection algorithm can obtain accuracy as high as 99% with only one hour of training data. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first study focusing on IoT cryptojacking and the first study analyzing various attacker behaviors and network settings in the area of cryptojacking detection.
In the past three years, the continuous fuzzing projects Syzkaller and Syzbot have achieved great success in detecting kernel vulnerabilities, finding more kernel bugs than those found in the past 20 years. However, a side effect of continuous fuzzing is that it generates an excessive number of crash reports, many of which are “duplicated” reports caused by the same bug. While Syzbot uses a simple heuristic to group (deduplicate) reports, we find that it is often inaccurate. In this paper, we empirically analyze the duplicated kernel bug reports to understand: (1) the prevalence of duplication; (2) the potential costs introduced by duplication; and (3) the key causes behind the duplication problem. We collected all of the fixed kernel bugs from September 2017 to November 2020, including 3.24 million crash reports grouped by Syzbot under 2,526 bug reports (identified by unique bug titles). We found the bug reports indeed had duplication: 47.1% of the 2,526 bug reports are duplicated with one or more other reports. By analyzing the metadata of these reports, we found undetected duplication introduced extra costs in terms of time and developer efforts. Then we organized Linux kernel experts to analyze a sample of duplicated bugs (375 bug reports, unique 120 bugs) and identified 6 key contributing factors to the duplication. Based on these empirical findings, we proposed and prototyped actionable strategies for bug deduplication. After confirming their effectiveness using a ground-truth dataset, we further applied our methods and identified previously unknown duplication cases among open bugs.
Deep neural networks have achieved remarkable success on a variety of mission-critical tasks. However, recent studies show that deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where the attacker releases backdoored models that behave normally on benign samples but misclassify any trigger-imposed samples to a target label. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks manipulate both the inputs and the model, perturbing samples with the trigger and injecting backdoors into the model. In this paper, we propose a novel attention-based evasive backdoor attack, dubbed ATTEQ-NN. Different from existing works that arbitrarily set the trigger mask, we carefully design an attention-based trigger mask determination framework, which places the trigger at the crucial region with the most significant influence on the prediction results. To make the trigger-imposed samples appear more natural and imperceptible to human inspectors, we introduce a Quality-of-Experience (QoE) term into the loss function of trigger generation and carefully adjust the transparency of the trigger. During the process of iteratively optimizing the trigger generation and the backdoor injection components, we propose an alternating retraining strategy, which is shown to be effective in improving the clean data accuracy and evading some model-based defense approaches. We evaluate ATTEQ-NN with extensive experiments on VGG- Flower, CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and CIFAR-100 datasets. The results show that ATTEQ-NN can increase the attack success rate by as high as 82% over baselines when the poison ratio is low while achieving a high QoE of the backdoored samples. We demonstrate that ATTEQ-NN reaches an attack success rate of more than 41.7% in the physical world under different lighting conditions and shooting angles. ATTEQ-NN preserves an attack success rate of more than 92.5% even if the original backdoored model is fine-tuned with clean data. Our user studies show that the backdoored samples generated by ATTEQ-NN are indiscernible under visual inspections. ATTEQ-NN is shown to be evasive to state-of-the-art defense methods, including model pruning, NAD, STRIP, NC, and MNTD.
Embedded devices are ubiquitous. However, preliminary evidence shows that attack mitigations protecting our desktops/servers/phones are missing in embedded devices, posing a significant threat to embedded security. To this end, this paper presents an in-depth study on the adoption of common attack mitigations on embedded devices. Precisely, it measures the presence of standard mitigations against memory corruptions in over 10k Linux-based firmware of deployed embedded devices. The study reveals that embedded devices largely omit both user-space and kernel-level attack mitigations. The adoption rates on embedded devices are multiple times lower than their desktop counterparts. An equally important observation is that the situation is not improving over time. Without changing the current practices, the attack mitigations will remain missing, which may become a bigger threat in the upcoming IoT era. Throughout follow-up analyses, we further inferred a set of factors possibly contributing to the absence of attack mitigations. The exemplary ones include massive reuse of non-protected software, lateness in upgrading outdated kernels, and restrictions imposed by automated building tools. We envision these will turn into insights towards improving the adoption of attack mitigations on embedded devices in the future.
Code virtualization is a well-known sophisticated obfuscation technique that uses custom virtual machines (VM) to emulate the semantics of original native instructions. Commercial VM-based obfuscators (e.g., Themida and VMProtect) are often abused by malware developers to conceal malicious behaviors. Since the internal mechanism of commercial obfuscators is a black box, it is a daunting challenge for the analyst to understand the behavior of virtualized programs. To figure out the code virtualization mechanism and design deobfuscation techniques, the analyst has to perform reverse-engineering on large-scale highly obfuscated programs. This knowledge learning process suffers from painful cost and imprecision. In this project, we study how to automatically extract knowledge from the commercial VM-based obfuscator via a novel textit{chosen-instruction attack} (CIA) technique. Our idea is inspired by chosen-plaintext attack, which is a cryptanalysis attack model to gain information that reduces the security of the encryption scheme. Given a commercial VM-based obfuscator, we carefully construct input programs, proactively interact with the obfuscator, and extract knowledge from virtualized output programs. We propose using the anchor instruction and the guided simplification technique to efficiently locate and extract knowledge-related instructions from output programs, respectively. Our experimental results demonstrate that the modern commercial VM-based obfuscators are under the threat of CIA. We have discovered 760 anchor instructions and extracted 1,915 verified instruction mapping rules from the four most widely used commercial obfuscators. The extracted knowledge enables security analysts to understand virtualized malware and improve deobfuscation techniques. Besides, we also contributed the first fine-grained benchmark suite for systematically evaluating the deobfuscation techniques. The evaluation result shows that three state-of-the-art deobfuscation techniques are insufficient to defeat modern commercial VM-based obfuscators and can be improved by our extracted knowledge.
This paper studies the role of multiparty shuffling protocols in enabling more efficient metadata-hiding communication. We show that the process of shuffling messages can be expedited by having servers collaboratively shuffle and verify secret-shares of messages instead of using a conventional mixnet approach where servers take turns performing independent verifiable shuffles of user messages. We apply this technique to achieve both practical and asymptotic improvements in anonymous broadcast and messaging systems. We first show how to build a three server anonymous broadcast scheme, secure against one malicious server, that relies only on symmetric cryptography. Next, we adapt our three server broadcast scheme to a k-server scheme secure against k-1 malicious servers, at the cost of a more expensive per-shuffle preprocessing phase. Finally, we show how our scheme can be used to significantly improve the performance of the MCMix anonymous messaging system. We implement our shuffling protocol in a system called Clarion and find that it outperforms a mixnet made up of a sequence of verifiable (single-server) shuffles by 9.2x for broadcasting small messages and outperforms the MCMix conversation protocol by 11.8x.
Fuzzing is popular for bug detection and vulnerability discovery nowadays. To adopt fuzzing for concurrency problems like data races, several recent concurrency fuzzing approaches consider concurrency information of program execution, and explore thread interleavings by affecting threads scheduling at runtime. However, these approaches are still limited in data-race detection. On the one hand, they fail to consider the execution contexts of thread interleavings, which can miss real data races in specific runtime contexts. On the other hand, they perform random thread-interleaving exploration, which frequently repeats already covered thread interleavings and misses many infrequent thread interleavings. In this paper, we develop a novel concurrency fuzzing framework named CONZZER, to effectively explore thread interleavings and detect hard-to-find data races. The core of CONZZER is a context-sensitive and directional concurrency fuzzing approach for thread-interleaving exploration, with two new techniques. First, to ensure context sensitivity, we propose a new concurrencycoverage metric, concurrent call pair, to describe thread interleavings with runtime calling contexts. Second, to directionally explore thread interleavings, we propose an adjacency-directed mutation to generate new possible thread interleavings with already covered thread interleavings and then use a breakpoint-control method to attempt to actually cover them at runtime. With these two techniques, this concurrency fuzzing approach can effectively cover infrequent thread interleavings with concrete context information, to help discover hard-to-find data races. We have evaluated CONZZER on 8 user-level applications and 4 kernel-level filesystems, and found 95 real data races. We identify 75 of these data races to be harmful and send them to related developers, and 44 have been confirmed. We also compare CONZZER to existing fuzzing tools, and CONZZER continuously explores more thread interleavings and finds many real data races missed by these tools.
Scripting languages like JavaScript are being integrated into commercial software to support easy file modification. For example, Adobe Acrobat accepts JavaScript to dynamically manipulate PDF files. To bridge the gap between the high-level scripts and the low-level languages (like C/C++) used to implement the software, a binding layer is necessary to transfer data and transform representations. However, due to the complexity of two sides, the binding code is prone to inconsistent semantics and security holes, which lead to severe vulnerabilities. Existing efforts for testing binding code merely focus on the script side, and thus miss bugs that require special program native inputs. In this paper, we propose cooperative mutation, which modifies both the script code and the program native input to trigger bugs in binding code. Our insight is that many bugs are due to the interplay between the program initial state and the dynamic operations, which can only be triggered through two-dimensional mutations. We develop three novel techniques to enable practical cooperative mutation on popular scripting languages: we first cluster objects into semantics similar classes to reduce the mutation space of native inputs; then, we statistically infer the relationship between script code and object classes based on a large number of executions; at last, we use the inferred relationship to select proper objects and related script code for targeted mutation. We applied our tool, COOPER, on three popular systems that integrate scripting languages, including Adobe Acrobat, Foxit Reader and Microsoft Word. COOPER successfully found 134 previously unknown bugs. We have reported all of them to the developers. At the time of paper publishing, 59 bugs have been fixed and 33 of them are assigned CVE numbers. We are awarded totally 22K dollars bounty for 17 out of all reported bugs.
Memory corruption attacks against unsafe programming languages like C/C++ have been a major threat to computer systems for multiple decades. Various sanitizers and runtime exploit mitigation techniques have been shown to only provide partial protection at best. Recently developed ‘safe’ programming languages such as Rust and Go hold the promise to change this paradigm by preventing memory corruption bugs using a strong type system and proper compile-time and runtime checks. Gradual deployment of these languages has been touted as a way of improving the security of existing applications before entire applications can be developed in safe languages. This is notable in popular applications such as Firefox and Tor. In this paper, we systematically analyze the security of multi-language applications. We show that because language safety checks in safe languages and exploit mitigation techniques applied to unsafe languages (e.g., Control-Flow Integrity) break different stages of an exploit to prevent control hijacking attacks, an attacker can carefully maneuver between the languages to mount a successful attack. In essence, we illustrate that the incompatible set of assumptions made in various languages enables attacks that are not possible in each language alone. We study different variants of these attacks and analyze Firefox to illustrate the feasibility and extent of this problem. Our findings show that gradual deployment of safe programming languages, if not done with extreme care, can indeed be detrimental to security.
Embedded and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices have seen an increase in adoption in many domains. The security of these devices is of great importance as they are often used to control critical infrastructure, medical devices, and vehicles. Existing solutions to isolate microcontroller (MCU) resources in order to increase their security face significant challenges such as specific hardware unavailability, Memory Protection Unit (MPU) limitations and a significant lack of Direct Memory Access (DMA) support. Nevertheless, DMA is fundamental for the power and performance requirements of embedded applications. In this paper, we present D-Box, a systematic approach to enable secure DMA operations for compartmentalization solutions of embedded applications using real-time operating systems (RTOS). D Box defines a reference architecture and a workflow to protect DMA operations holistically. It provides practical methods to harden the kernel and define capability-based security policies for easy definition of DMA operations with strong security properties. We implemented a D-Box prototype for the Cortex M3/M4 on top of the popular FreeRTOS-MPU (F-MPU). The D-Box procedures and a stricter security model enabled DMA operations, yet it exposed 41 times less ROP (return-orienting-programming) gadgets when compared with the standard F-MPU. D-Box adds only a 2% processor overhead while reducing the power consumption of peripheral operation benchmarks by 18.2%. The security properties and performance of D Box were tested and confirmed on a real-world case study of a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) application.
A new type of underground illicit drug promotion, illicit drug business listings on local search services (e.g., local knowledge panel, map search, voice search), is increasingly being utilized by miscreants to advertise and sell controlled substances on the Internet. Miscreants exploit the problematic upstream local data brokers featuring loose control on data quality to post listings that promote illicit drug business. Such a promotion, in turn, pollutes the major downstream search providers’ knowledge bases and further reaches a large audience through web, map, and voice searches. To the best of our knowledge, little has been done so far to understand this new illicit promotion in terms of its scope, impact, and techniques, not to mention any effort to identify such illicit drug business listings on a large scale. In this paper, we report the first measurement study of the illicit drug business listings on local search services. Our findings have brought to light the vulnerable and less regulated local business listing ecosystem and the pervasiveness of such illicit activities, as well as the impact on local search audience.
Many large organizations operate dedicated wide area networks (WANs) distinct from the Internet to connect their data centers and remote sites through high-throughput links. While encryption generally protects these WANs well against content eavesdropping, they remain vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks that infer visited websites, watched videos or contents of VoIP calls from analysis of the traffic volume, packet sizes or timing information. Existing techniques to obfuscate Internet traffic are not well suited for WANs as they are either highly inefficient or require modifications to the communication protocols used by end hosts. This paper presents ditto, a traffic obfuscation system adapted to the requirements of WANs: achieving high-throughput traffic obfuscation at line rate without modifications of end hosts. ditto adds padding to packets and introduces chaff packets to make the resulting obfuscated traffic independent of production traffic with respect to packet sizes, timing and traffic volume. We evaluate a full implementation of ditto running on programmable switches in the network data plane. Our results show that ditto runs at 100 Gbps line rate and performs with negligible performance overhead up to a realistic traffic load of 70 Gbps per WAN link.
Browser fingerprinting aims to identify users or their devices, through scripts that execute in the users browser and collect information on software or hardware characteristics. It is used to track users or as an additional means of identification to improve security. Fingerprinting techniques have one significant limitation: they are unable to track individual users for an extended duration. This happens because browser fingerprints evolve over time, and these evolutions ultimately cause a fingerprint to be confused with those from other devices sharing similar hardware and software. In this paper, we report on a new technique that can significantly extend the tracking time of fingerprint-based tracking methods. Our technique, which we call DrawnApart, is a new GPU fingerprinting technique that identifies a device from the unique properties of its GPU stack. Specifically, we show that variations in speed among the multiple execution units that comprise a GPU can serve as a reliable and robust device signature, which can be collected using unprivileged JavaScript. We investigate the accuracy of DrawnApart under two scenarios. In the first scenario, our controlled experiments confirm that the technique is effective in distinguishing devices with similar hardware and software configurations, even when they are considered identical by current state-of-the-art fingerprinting algorithms. In the second scenario, we integrate a one-shot learning version of our technique into a state-of-the-art browser fingerprint tracking algorithm. We verify our technique through a large-scale experiment involving data collected from over 2,500 crowd-sourced devices over a period of several months and show it provides a boost of up to 67% to the median tracking duration, compared to the state-of-the-art method. DrawnApart makes two contributions to the state of the art in browser fingerprinting. On the conceptual front, it is the first work that explores the manufacturing differences between identical GPUs and the first to exploit these differences in a privacy context. On the practical front, it demonstrates a robust technique for distinguishing between machines with identical hardware and software configurations, a technique that delivers practical accuracy gains in a realistic setting.
Browser fingerprinting aims to identify users or their devices, through scripts that execute in the users’ browser and collect information on software or hardware characteristics. It is used to track users or as an additional means of identification to improve security. Fingerprinting techniques have one significant limitation: they are unable to track individual users for an extended duration. This happens because browser fingerprints evolve over time, and these evolutions ultimately cause a fingerprint to be confused with those from other devices sharing similar hardware and software. In this paper, we report on a new technique that can significantly extend the tracking time of fingerprint-based tracking methods. Our technique, which we call DRAWNAPART, is a new GPU fingerprinting technique that identifies a device from the unique properties of its GPU stack. Specifically, we show that variations in speed among the multiple execution units that comprise a GPU can serve as a reliable and robust device signature, which can be collected using unprivileged JavaScript. We investigate the accuracy of DRAWNAPART under two scenarios. In the first scenario, our controlled experiments confirm that the technique is effective in distinguishing devices with similar hardware and software configurations, even when they are considered identical by current state-of-the-art fingerprinting algorithms. In the second scenario, we integrate a one-shot learning version of our technique into a state-of-the-art browser fingerprint tracking algorithm. We verify our technique through a large-scale experiment involving data collected from over 2,500 crowd-sourced devices over a period of several months and show it provides a boost of up to 67% to the median tracking duration, compared to the state-of-the-art method. DRAWNAPART makes two contributions to the state of the art in browser fingerprinting. On the conceptual front, it is the first work that explores the manufacturing differences between *Both authors are considered co-first authors. identical GPUs and the first to exploit these differences in a privacy context. On the practical front, it demonstrates a robust technique for distinguishing between machines with identical hardware and software configurations, a technique that delivers practical accuracy gains in a realistic setting.
Lateral movement is a key stage of system compromise used by advanced persistent threats. Detecting it is no simple task. When network host logs are abstracted into discrete temporal graphs, the problem can be reframed as anomalous edge detection in an evolving network. Research in modern deep graph learning techniques has produced many creative and complicated models for this task. However, as is the case in many machine learning fields, the generality of models is of paramount importance for accuracy and scalability during training and inference. In this paper, we propose a formalized approach to this problem with a framework we call Euler. It consists of a model-agnostic graph neural network stacked upon a model-agnostic sequence encoding layer such as a recurrent neural network. Models built according to the Euler framework can easily distribute their graph convolutional layers across multiple machines for large performance improvements. Additionally, we demonstrate that Euler-based models are competitive, or better than many state-of-the-art approaches to anomalous link detection and prediction. As anomaly-based intrusion detection systems, Euler models can efficiently identify anomalous connections between entities with high precision and outperform other unsupervised techniques for anomalous lateral movement detection.
Many systems today rely heavily on virtual private network (VPN) technology to connect networks and protect services on the Internet. While prior studies compare the performance of different implementations, they do not consider adversarial settings. To address this gap, we evaluate the resilience of VPN implementations to flooding-based denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. We focus on a class of emph{stateless flooding} attacks, which are particularly threatening because an attacker that operates stealthily by spoofing its IP addresses can perform them. We have implemented various attacks to evaluate the DoS resilience of four widely used VPN solutions and measured their impact on a high-performance server with a $40,mathrm{Gb/s}$ interface, which has revealed surprising results: An adversary can deny data transfer over an already established WireGuard connection with just $300,mathrm{Mb/s}$ of attack traffic. When using strongSwan (IPsec), $75,mathrm{Mb/s}$ of attack traffic is sufficient to block connection establishment. A $100,mathrm{Mb/s}$ flood overwhelms OpenVPN, denying data transfer through VPN connections and connection establishments. Cisco's AnyConnect VPN solution can be overwhelmed with even less attack traffic: When using IPsec, $50,mathrm{Mb/s}$ of attack traffic deny connection establishment. When using SSL, $50,mathrm{Mb/s}$ suffice to deny data transfer over already established connections. Furthermore, performance analysis of WireGuard revealed significant inefficiencies in the implementation related to multi-core synchronization. We also found vulnerabilities in the implementations of strongSwan and OpenVPN, which an attacker can easily exploit for highly effective DoS attacks. These findings demonstrate the need for adversarial testing of VPN implementations with respect to DoS resilience.
We present F-PKI, an enhancement to the HTTPS public-key infrastructure (or web PKI) that gives trust flexibility to both clients and domain owners, and enables certification authorities (CAs) to enforce stronger security measures. In today's web PKI, all CAs are equally trusted, and security is defined by the weakest link. We address this problem by introducing trust flexibility in two dimensions: with F-PKI, each domain owner can define a domain policy (specifying, for example, which CAs are authorized to issue certificates for their domain name) and each client can set or choose a validation policy based on trust levels. F-PKI thus supports a property that is sorely needed in today's Internet: trust heterogeneity. Different parties can express different trust preferences while still being able to verify all certificates. In contrast, today's web PKI only allows clients to fully distrust suspicious/misbehaving CAs, which is likely to cause collateral damage in the form of legitimate certificates being rejected. Our contribution is to present a system that is backward compatible, provides sensible security properties to both clients and domain owners, ensures the verifiability of all certificates, and prevents downgrade attacks. Furthermore, F-PKI provides a ground for innovation, as it gives CAs an incentive to deploy new security measures to attract more customers, without having these measures undercut by vulnerable CAs.
How to defend against presentation attacks via artificial fake fingers is a core challenge in fingerprint biometrics. The trade-off among security, usability, and production cost has driven researchers to reach a common standpoint, i.e., integrate the commercial fingerprint technology with anti-spoofing detection (e.g., ridge traits). These anti-spoofing solutions are perceived as sufficiently resilient under the assumption that a fake finger can never closely relate to a live finger due to either composition of spoofing materials or non-automated manufacturing errors. In this paper, we first identify the vulnerability of in-practice anti-spoofing solutions in commercial fingerprint products. Instead of using expensive 3D fake fingers (above USD $1000), we mimic a more realistic scenario where an attacker fabricates high-precision fake fingerprints using low-cost polyvinylacetate materials (less than USD $50). Building on this, we introduce a practical and secure countermeasure, namely FakeGuard, to overcome the exposed vulnerability. We examine the nature of 3D haptic response effect that arises when a fingertip epidermis interacts with a tactile surface and reflects the disparate anatomy of live and fake fingers. Unlike the previous mitigation strategies, FakeGuard offers both hardware and software compatibility with existing fingerprint scanners. As the first exploration of haptic-based anti-spoofing solution, we demonstrate the capability of FakeGuard to prevent known and unknown fake finger attacks with an average detection error of 1.4%. We also examine and prove FakeGuard resilience against seven different physical attacks, e.g., brute-force through pressure variations or partial fingerprints, haptic response alteration via advanced spoofing materials or side-channel interference, and denial-of-service attacks by manipulating the moisture, lighting, and temperature of the ambient environment.
Supply chains have become a pillar of our economic world, and they have brought tremendous advantages to both enterprises and users. These networks consist of companies and suppliers with the goal of reducing costs and production time by offloading various stages of the production process to third party foundries. Although globalized supply chains offer many advantages, they are also vulnerable to attacks at many different points along the pipeline. For Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, this problem is exacerbated by firmware vulnerabilities, which influence the low-level control of the system hardware. Moreover, according to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) the number of firmware vulnerabilities within IoT devices is rapidly increasing every year, making such firmware vulnerabilities a cause for growing concern and magnifying the need to address emerging firmware vulnerabilities. In this paper we attempt to define and expand upon a class of firmware vulnerability that is characterized by the malicious configuration of power management integrated circuits (PMIC). We propose a firmware attack construction and deployment on power management IC (FANDEMIC) that involves reverse engineering bare-metal IoT firmware binaries and identifying the functions that interact with its PMIC. We demonstrate the possibility of directly altering the binary to deliberately misconfigure the PMIC such that supply line voltages are altered, which could result in a variety of problems with the device. We propose a workflow to reverse engineer the binary, using Ghidra and Python scripting, and provide two simple, but novel function matching algorithms. Furthermore, we highlight and discuss the potential aforementioned consequences of PMIC attacks, in particular, battery degradation and failure, accelerated aging effects, and sensor data corruption. As a proof of concept we implement the proposed attack on an nRF52 microcontroller and a MAX20303 PMIC to demonstrate sensor data corruption. Finally, we discuss possible mitigation techniques, which include binary auditing and secure firmware updates.
Adversarial Examples (AEs) can deceive Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) and have received a lot of attention recently. However, majority of the research on AEs is in the digital domain and the adversarial patches are static. Such research is very different from many real-world DNN applications such as Traffic Sign Recognition (TSR) systems in autonomous vehicles. In TSR systems, object detectors use DNNs to process streaming video in real time. From the view of object detectors, the traffic sign’s position and quality of the video are continuously changing, rendering the digital AEs ineffective in the physical world. In this paper, we propose a systematic pipeline to generate robust physical AEs against real-world object detectors. Robustness is achieved in three ways. First, we simulate the in-vehicle cameras by extending the distribution of image transformations with the blur transformation and the resolution transformation. Second, we design the single and multiple bounding boxes filters to improve the efficiency of the perturbation training. Third, we consider four representative attack vectors, namely Hiding Attack (HA), Appearance Attack (AA), Non-Target Attack (NTA) and Target Attack (TA). For each of them, a loss function is defined to minimize the impact of the fabrication process on the physical AEs. We perform a comprehensive set of experiments under a variety of environmental conditions by varying the distance from $0m$ to $30m$, changing the angle from $-60^{circ}$ to $60^{circ}$, and considering illuminations in sunny and cloudy weather as well as at night. The experimental results show that the physical AEs generated from our pipeline are effective and robust when attacking the YOLO v5 based TSR system. The attacks have good transferability and can deceive other state-of-the-art object detectors. We launched HA and NTA on a brand-new 2021 model vehicle. Both attacks are successful in fooling the TSR system, which could be a lifethreatening case for autonomous vehicles. Finally, we discuss three defense mechanisms based on image preprocessing, AEs detection, and model enhancing.
Inaudible voice command injection is one of the most threatening attacks towards voice assistants. Existing attacks aim at injecting the attack signals over the air, but they require the access to the authorized user’s voice for activating the voice assistants. Moreover, the effectiveness of the attacks can be greatly deteriorated in a noisy environment. In this paper, we explore a new type of channel, the power line side-channel, to launch the inaudible voice command injection. By injecting the audio signals over the power line through a modified charging cable, the attack becomes more resilient against various environmental factors and liveness detection models. Meanwhile, the smartphone audio output can be eavesdropped through the modified cable, enabling a highly-interactive attack. To exploit the power line side-channel, we present GhostTalk , a new hidden voice attack that is capable of injecting and eavesdropping simultaneously. Via a quick modification of the power bank cables, the attackers could launch interactive attacks by remotely making a phone call or capturing private information from the voice assistants. GhostTalk overcomes the challenge of bypassing the speaker verification system by stealthily triggering a switch component to simulate the press button on the headphone. In case when the smartphones are charged by an unaltered standard cable, we discover that it is possible to recover the audio signal from smartphone loudspeakers by monitoring the charging current on the power line. To demonstrate the feasibility, we design GhostTalk-SC , an adaptive eavesdropper system targeting smartphones charged in the public USB ports. To correctly recognize the private information in the audio, GhostTalk-SC carefully extracts audio spectra and integrates a neural network model to classify spoken digits in the speech. We launch GhostTalk and GhostTalk-SC attacks towards 9 main-stream commodity smartphones. The experimental results prove that GhostTalk can inject unauthorized voice commands to different smartphones with 100% success rate, and the injected audios can fool human ears and multiple liveness detection models. Moreover, GhostTalk-SC achieves 92% accuracy on average for recognizing spoken digits on different smartphones, which makes it an easily-deployable but highly-effective attack that could infiltrate sensitive information such as passwords and verification codes. For defense, we provide countermeasure recommendations to defend against this new threat.
Team Chat (textit{TACT}) systems are now widely used for online collaborations and project management. A unique feature of these systems is their integration of third-party apps, which extends their capabilities but also brings in the complexity that could potentially put the TACT system and its end-users at risk. In this paper, for the first time, we demonstrate that third-party apps in TACT systems indeed open the door to new security risks, such as privilege escalation, deception, and privacy leakage. We studied 12 popular TACT systems, following the key steps of a third-party app's life cycle (its installation, update, configuration, and runtime operations). Notably, we designed and implemented a pipeline for efficiently identifying the security risks of TA APIs, a core feature provided for system-app communication. Our study leads to the discovery of 55 security issues across the 12 platforms, with 25 in the install and configuration stages and 30 vulnerable (or risky) APIs. These security weaknesses are mostly introduced by improper design, lack of fine-grained access control, and ambiguous data-access policies. We reported our findings to all related parties, and 8 have been acknowledged. Although we are still working with the TACT vendors to determine the security impacts of the remaining flaws, their significance has already been confirmed by our user study, which further reveals users' concerns about some security policies implemented on mainstream TACT platforms and their misconceptions about the protection in place. Also, our communication with the vendors indicates that their threat models have not been well-thought-out, with some assumptions conflicting with each other. We further provide suggestions to enhance the security quality of today's TACT systems.
Generating randomness by public participation allows participants to contribute randomness directly and verify the result's security. Ideally, the difficulty of participating in such activities should be as low as possible to reduce the computational burden of being a contributor. However, existing randomness generation protocols are unsuitable for this scenario because of scalability or usability issues. Hence, in this paper we present HeadStart, a participatory randomness protocol designed for public participation at scale. HeadStart allows contributors to verify the result on commodity devices efficiently, and provides a parameter $L$ that can make the result-publication latency $L$ times lower. Additionally, we propose two implementation improvements to speed up the verification further and reduce the proof size. The verification complexity of HeadStart is only $O(L times polylog(T) +log C)$ for a contribution phase lasting for time $T$ with $C$ contributions.
We propose an optical side-channel attack to recover intellectual property in Additive Manufacturing (AM) systems. Specifically, we use a deep neural network to estimate the coordinates of the printhead as a function of time by analyzing the video of the printer frame by frame. We found that the deep neural network can successfully recover the path for an arbitrary printing process. By using data augmentation, the neural network can tolerate a certain level of variation in the position and angle of the camera as well as the lighting conditions. The neural network can intelligently perform interpolation and accurately recover the coordinates of an image that is not seen in the training dataset. To defend against the optical side-channel attack, we propose to use the optical noise injection method. Specifically, we use an optical projector to artificially inject carefully crafted optical noise onto the printing area in an attempt to confuse the attacker and make it harder to recover the printing path. We found that existing noise generation algorithms, such as replaying, random blobs, white noise, and full power, can effortlessly defeat a naive attacker who is not aware of the existence of the injected noise. However, an advanced attacker who knows about the injected noise and incorporates images with injected noise in the training dataset can defeat all of the existing noise generation algorithms. To defend against such an advanced attacker, we propose three novel noise generation algorithms: channel uniformization, state uniformization, and state randomization. Our experiment results show that noise generated via state randomization can successfully defend against the advanced attacker.
Trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel SGX relies on hardware protection and can perform secure multi-party computation (MPC) much more efficiently than pure software solutions. However, multiple side-channel attacks have been discovered in current implementations, leading to various levels of trust among different parties. For instance, a party might assume that an adversary is unable to compromise TEE, while another might only have a partial trust in TEE or even does not trust it at all. In an MPC scenario consisting of parties with different levels of trust, one could fall back to pure software solutions. While satisfying the security concerns of all parties, those who accept TEE would not be able to enjoy the benefit brought by it. In this paper, we study the above-mentioned scenario by proposing HybrTC, a generic framework for evaluating a function in the emph{hybrid trust} manner. We give a security formalization in universal composability (UC) and introduce a new cryptographic model for the TEEs-like hardware, named emph{multifaceted trusted hardware} $mathcal{F}_{TH}$, that captures various levels of trust perceived by different parties. To demonstrate the relevance of the hybrid setting, we give a distributed database scenario where a user completely or partially trusts different TEEs in protecting her distributed query, whereas multiple servers refuse to use TEE in protecting their sensitive databases. We propose a maliciously-secure protocol for a typical select-and-join query in the multi-party setting. Experimental result has shown that on two servers with $2^{20}$ records in datasets, and with a quarter of records being selected, only 165.82s is incurred which achieves more than $18,752.58times$ speedups compared to cryptographic solutions.