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We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, convergence of the last-iterate to a Nash equilibrium. Although the non-bandit case has been studied extensively, this setting has only been explored recently, with a bound of $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/8})$ on the exploitability gap. We show that, for uncoupled algorithms, guaranteeing convergence of the policy profiles to a Nash equilibrium is detrimental to the performances, with the best attainable rate being $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/4})$ in contrast to the usual $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/2})$ rate for convergence of the average iterates. We then propose two algorithms that achieve this optimal rate. The first algorithm leverages a straightforward tradeoff between exploration and exploitation, while the second employs a regularization technique based on a two-step mirror descent approach.