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Covert channels are a method of communication that is used to exfiltrate information from computing devices and break the security policy of computer systems. Any shared resource can be potentially leveraged as a covert channel, and conventional wisdom of cyber-security believes that air-gapped computing devices, disconnected from the Internet, are highly secured. Recent studies show that advanced covert channel attacks using acoustic, thermal, and electromagnetic effects can only work under a limited proximity constraint (e.g., within 2 meters). In this work, we present SpiralSpy, a new covert channel to attack air-gapped computing devices through millimeter-wave (mmWave) sensing technologies. SpiralSpy can be stealthily launched and circumvent strongly isolated computing devices from a practical distance (up to 8 meters). Specifically, we demonstrate that ordinal cooling fans can be leveraged for covert channel attacks. A malicious software inside air-gapped computing devices can saliently encode confidential data into the fan control signals, and modulated status on fan motions can be remotely decoded by a commodity mmWave sensor. SpiralSpy can be adopted on multiple-fan systems and enable a scalable capacity for multi-channel and high-speed information transfer. We evaluate SpiralSpy with 71 computing devices with cooling fans. Experimental results demonstrate that SpiralSpy can achieve up to 6 bps that is 6-24X faster than existing covert channels on air-gapped computing devices. We evaluate the usability and robustness of SpiralSpy under different real-world scenarios. Moreover, we conduct in-depth analysis and discussion on countermeasures for SpiralSpy-based covert channel attacks to improve computer and information security.